

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

Chapter 4: The Preparedness of National Institutions for Devolution in Zimbabwe with respect to Selected Services

Kudzai Chatiza¹ and Angeline Sithole²

Abstract

Zimbabwe has had positive patches of local government reforms in both colonial and post-colonial times. In these periods, transformation progressed where the priorities of national and sub-national politicians and bureaucrats aligned, and where there was a misalignment decentralisation and related reforms stalled followed by centralisation. The 1980 to 1996 period saw reforms which somewhat entrenched the depth and range democracy and local development. We have written elsewhere on the continued control of local government institutions and their management by the centre (Chatiza 2010) resulting in strained and unsustainable devolution that Zimbabwe experimented with from early independence (Matyszack 2010). This has made for shallow reforms. The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 has created an opportunity for devolution implementation and this chapter assesses whether national institutions are prepared to implement devolved governance. It also makes suggestions for how their preparedness could be increased at national and sub-national levels.

Defining Devolution and Preparedness to Implement

We conceptualise devolution as a form of decentralisation and a political variant concerned with the legal transfer of decision-making and implementing powers as well as resources to legally constituted and popularly elected local governments (ICJ Kenya 2013, AU 2015, Kauzya 2007; Devas and Delay 2006). We draw on Articles 3 and 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act (2002), the Yaoundé Declaration of 2005 and the African Union vision 2063, to show regional trends in adoption of devolution as a governance framework. The African Union (2015) identifies decentralisation as the strengthening of sub-national levels of government to foster people's participation and the delivery of quality services. This suggests that local government constitutionalisation is a means rather than an end. Further, devolution emphasises i) spatial or territorial organisation, ii) natural resource management and iii) fiscal resource allocation (Chirisa et al 2013). Contests over power that often stall devolved governance arise from the disjuncture between political elites and ordinary citizens in state building (Chinsanga 2011, Mlambo 2009). This disjuncture engenders policy contradictions, results in incomplete social transformation and often sparks violent state capture (Thomas 2015). Devolution promises an overhaul of a country's system of governance as is the emerging case in Kenya (ICJ Kenya 2013) principally because power sharing, decentralisation of resources, checks and balances are made an explicit agenda. Based on this understanding of devolution and acknowledging Zimbabwe's governance crisis which peaked in 2008 forcing a power-sharing government, the paper rejects the narrative that devolution was a compromise inclusion in the constitution on two grounds. First, Zimbabwe is not new to an operationalisation of devolution, and second, devolution was a consistently and robustly long-fought-for outcome (Hammar 2003 and Muzondidya 2009) that the first generation of post-independence Zimbabweans needs to appropriate and celebrate.

We look at whether national institutions are prepared to implement devolution. While acknowledging further analysis is required we propose a preparedness framework. This is based on Fombad (2011) who defines constitutionalism as i) recognition and protection of freedoms and rights, ii) separation of

¹ Development Governance Institute, www.degi.co.zw

² Midlands State University, Department of Local Government Studies

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

powers, iii) an independent judiciary, iv) review of the constitutionality of laws, v) control of the amendment of the constitution and vi) presence of institutions supportive of democracy. Africa's experience with these constitutionalism parameters is considered weak as only procedural notions of constitutionalism emphasising values not institutions capable of converting them into practical results are delivered (Ibid). Most African countries still lack robust responses by the judiciary and civil society regarding the holding of governments to account. A devolved system increases citizen participation in holding the state to account which is critical for local democracy (IDEA 2013).

We analyse devolution preparedness with respect to suitability of existing institutional structures and practices. This is read in the context of the clarity with which citizens stated their expectations for substantially deep reforms and positive changes in governance (see BPRO 2013, CHRA 2014, Chatiza and Chakaipa 2014). This articulation is against a background of the recent governance crises and stalled reforms (ICG 2011; 2014, Raftopoulos 2013a; 2013b, Matyszack 2010; 2013). Suitability becomes key considering the magnitude of governance changes defined in the constitution as spelt out in the Preamble and in Sections 3, 5, 8, 9, 13 and among others, the expansive Bill of Rights (Chapter 4). Sections 14 to 33 raise citizen expectations of local government institutions with respect to development objectives like employment and empowerment, food security, culture and gender balance. Significant implications arise in terms of leveraging local government performance towards realisation of these developmental rights. Further, the constitution dictates what central government has to do to enable such performance. Constitutional framers used the concept of the State to include its forms at national, provincial and local levels. This conversation on preparedness is about guaranteeing the execution of competences embedded in a developmental right like shelter, health and, among others education. Such execution is either exclusive to an individual tier of government and/or concurrently across the three tiers. The Zimbabwean state's performance has significant weaknesses and lacks whole-of-government policy development and implementation consistency.

Generalisable Preparedness and Indicative Gaps

Central government implementation of devolution is not necessarily about resetting everything. At least 92 relatively well established local governments governed by directly elected representatives, using resources principally raised locally and with the authority to make independent investment decisions exist in the country (DEGI 2013). Zimbabwe's local governments are fully and formally established and have legally recognised geographical boundaries within which they exercise authority and perform public functions. As such, Zimbabwe has longstanding and substantial traditions of devolution. Pre-1980 Urban Councils including Town Management Boards in cities like Harare (Chatiza 2010) and early independence District Councils were devolved (Matyszack 2010). For the latter national government retained control through its field offices (Ibid, CCMT 2015). Since 1898³ national institutions in Zimbabwe were mandated to function in a devolved system. Central government, among others, set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee overseeing alignment of legislation to the 2013 Constitution. The Ministry responsible for justice led the process and a General Laws Amendment Bill was placed before Parliament in May 2015. At the same time individual Ministries reviewed policies and laws in their sectors in light of the 2013 Constitution. Interaction between Ministries, the Parliament of Zimbabwe and non-state development organisations also ensured

³ Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of October 20th 1898 provides in paragraph 8 of Part II for the British South Africa Company to exercise general administration of affairs through Administrators with clear powers over defined territories.

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

constitutionalism in general remained on the top of the agenda. These constitute an array of efforts at preparing or readying central government to implement devolution.

However, there have been informed doubts expressed regarding the depth of the proposed reforms. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2015) for instance expressed concern that local government and other laws impacting on the protection of socio-economic rights and requiring fundamental amendments were unlikely to be changed going by the proposals in the 2015 General Laws Amendment Bill. Since the adoption of the Constitution in May 2013 national guidance was lacking on issues like i) practical objectives of devolution to be pursued at all three levels of government, ii) the devolution implementation process, iii) steps towards institutionalisation of participation particularly in key sectors, and iv) thresholds for devolution performance (Kauzya 2007; Devas and Delay 2006). Based on this framing this section of the paper uses health, state-owned enterprises, water and land sectors to reflect some of the challenges that detract national preparedness for devolution implementation. In using these sectors the discussion shows how an expectation of quick and pronouncement-based devolution is ill-founded. Deep state reforms are needed to fully install devolution in Zimbabwe.

Indicative Health Sector Gaps

The health sector has significant challenges being addressed based on centralised responses. Loewensen and Masotya (2008) identify gaps in terms of the following:

- i) High demand versus low coverage of services including access to safe water and sanitation, antiretroviral treatment and food security;
- ii) The disjuncture between ‘free care’ policies and real direct charges as well as indirect costs for health services that undermine service access in poor households;
- iii) Gaps demand and supply of drugs and skilled staff at the primary care level of the system;
- iv) Commitments and spending by the international community and government in the health budget, with rising demand on households to meet the gap;
- v) Expectations and real working conditions and incomes of health workers; and
- vi) The social capacities for promoting health within communities, and the legal and institutional recognition and support of these capacities.

The sector has seen considerable investment to recover from the dramatic capacity loss of the decade up to 2008. To 2014, there were improvements in child and maternal mortality, post-natal care, approaches to addressing the negative effects on health arising from socio-cultural and religious beliefs and in access to safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene practices (ZIMSTAT and ICF 2014). The 90% donor-funded and UNICEF-hosted Health Transition Fund (HTF) as well as the UNFPA-hosted Integrated Support Programme (ISP) have created conduits for sector funding (UNICEF 2015⁴) and therefore take most credit for the positive changes in the sector. However, structural failings remain because the sector still faces funding challenges and local authorities ceased to receive health grants in the late 1990s (Government of Zimbabwe 2004). Government has launched a Health Development Fund (HDF) which is a multi-donor fund building on the HTF and ISP to focus on reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health. USD85 million in HDF funding has been provided by the EU (UNICEF 2015).

⁴ See www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/media_16578.html (downloaded 15/10/2015)

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

From a national preparedness perspective it is critical to observe that health services have been run in a highly centralised manner. While the sector has seen considerable innovations implemented through multi-actor structures and programmes these have been led by the Ministry responsible for health. Programmes such as child immunisation, the fight against HIV/AIDS coordinated by the National AIDS Council and maternal health initiatives are delivered through a clear hierarchy of health facilities. The facilities include primary health care institutions largely owned by local authorities but staffed by Ministry personnel remunerated from the centre. In rural and small urban centres even community-level and primary care medical staff is part of the national health roster. These arrangements contradict the 'division by magnitude' principle where relevant services are a competence of local government. Essentially from both a funding perspective and in terms of institutional relations, a critical conversation on devolution is needed to prepare the health Ministry, relevant UN agencies, donors and other national level stakeholders for devolved health sector management. To date no policy has been developed in light of the Constitution. Such a policy is required to clearly define the health sector's i) financing, ii) information systems, iii) structure and management, especially of sector workforce including the role of the Health Services Board and other sector professional bodies for nurses, doctors etc, iv) service delivery systems including division of competences and v) infrastructure in a devolved fashion.

Indicative Gaps Regarding State-Owned Enterprises

Not all of Zimbabwe's state enterprises are decentralisation-easy. However, it is reasonable for the country to expect some clarity regarding how sub-national governments could participate in their governance and derive revenue critical for service delivery. The ones that are potentially relevant in this discussion are those that manage road and rail transport, agriculture-related enterprises, mining and energy sector companies, enterprises related to the natural environment, and among others, water and road infrastructure enterprises.⁵ Challenges involved with setting up and getting Community Share Ownership Trusts to accountably function also reflect the centralised approach that national institutions (Cabinet and responsible Ministries) use. Across central government there were robust discussions suggesting disharmony around the extractives sector (PAC 2012) and on indigenisation, providing partial evidence of a lack of preparedness to implement devolution. On governance, most state enterprises are not currently connected and accountable to local and provincial-metropolitan authorities but yet they are critical to local service delivery and development. The performance of state enterprises has been weak, depending on the national government for financial bailouts amid corruption and mismanagement (Government of Zimbabwe 2014; PAC 2012). The level of government closest to a state-owned enterprise and its subsidiaries has most information about its performance and therefore is best placed to oversee its operations (Huang et al 2015). Society and the relevant level of government also expect the enterprise to be a resource towards local development. As such, that level of government ought to be sufficiently and formally empowered to participate in the governance of the enterprise operating in its jurisdiction thereby allowing extraction of necessary

⁵ The respective authorities being the National Railways of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company, Grain Marketing Board, Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, Cold Storage Company, Hwange Colliery Company, the Mining Development Corporation, the Minerals Marketing entity, Companies that are part of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority Holdings, Forestry Company of Zimbabwe, Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, and the National Water Authority, Road Authority, District Development Fund

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

revenue for service delivery. Zimbabwe's pre and post-independence deployment of state-owned enterprises like TILCOR and UDCORP to 'develop' local areas shows the merit of clarifying how these become accountable and beneficial to sub-national tiers of government.

The macro, meso and micro level governance questions and risks posed by under-performing state-owned enterprises cannot be ignored. For instance, national energy insecurity affects socio-economic enterprises hampering the realisation of basic rights. The current institutions are a product of an amalgamation of previously devolved power producers with two main ones in Zimbabwe's two urban provinces. Associated with this consolidation were policy changes particularly adoption of a pan-territorial tariff resulting in some sharing of the costs of inefficiency and creation of a 'sensitive clients' list including politicians. Some of them were exposed recently for owing the utility thousands in debt (The Daily News 17th March 2012, 01st June 2015⁶; The Zimbabwe Independent 30th January 2015⁷, Nehanda Radio 16th March 2012⁸). Given the clear theoretical (Huang et al 2015) and empirical basis such as cases of corruption and unaccountability, the Government of Zimbabwe needs to come up with a devolved system for governing state enterprises. To the extent that such a framework does not currently exist we suggest that state-owned enterprises remain unprepared for devolution.

Water Sector Gaps

The rising population, urban growth and competing socio-economic activities such as agriculture, industrial and household water usage make the water supply situation critical. Some reforms have been implemented since independence and more intensely in the late 1990s (Government of Zimbabwe 2013b). Despite early progress, the water and sanitation challenges continue to be significant, including water scarcity, frequent sewerage malfunctionality, low service quality, erosion of affordability resulting in user debts, billing and collection inefficiencies, high non-revenue water⁹ gaps between general and active coverage and inability by service providers to expand or upgrade WASH systems (ZILGA et al 2014). For Human Rights Watch (2013) the challenges come from public sector corruption, mismanagement and lack of political will while Mapfumo and Madesha (2014) note population growth, poor and ageing infrastructure, economic challenges and climate change. Chinyama and Toma (2013) agree with the population growth and infrastructure failure explanations but further observe residents' behaviour as a key challenge. Hove and Tirimboi (2011) anchor their arguments on institutional failure showing how the takeover of WASH service delivery by ZINWA between 2005 and 2009 triggered performance constraints for Harare as an example.

The institutional framework for the water sector is generally decentralised but questions have arisen over the capacity of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) in recent years. Prior to 2005 the Authority (and its predecessors) focused on the bulk water side from infrastructure development, maintenance and sale of bulk water to user institutions in mining, farming and local government. Also, the loss of commercial farming clients following the land reform programme prompted ZINWA to go beyond bulk water provision. However, being centralised some of the small centres it serves

⁶ www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/06/01/zesagate-affair-mugabe-settling-power-bill downloaded 12/10/15

⁷ www.theindependent.co.zw/2015/01/30/cabinet-ministers-bleeding-zesa-outed/ downloaded 12/10/15

⁸ <http://nehandaradio.com/2012/03/16/mugabes-shock-350-000-zesa-bill/> downloaded 12/10/15

⁹ NRW for Kadoma is 79%, Kwekwe (63%), Harare (58%), Marondera (51%), Norton (54%), Rusape (56%), Kariba (59%) and Chipinge (80%)

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

throughout the country experience problems. Rural local governments and small towns like Chirundu find difficulty synchronising their land and housing development plans with ZINWA's own strategic planning resulting in unserved settlements. In the City of Bulawayo, ZINWA's services around the Nyamandlovu Aquifer also face pumping inefficiencies betraying capacity gaps.

The role of ZINWA and other institutions in the water sector needs to be reflected upon in light of the 2013 Constitution. This is critical from both the perspective of citizen participation and of the role of provincial-metropolitan and local authorities. Administrative structures and functions of ZINWA are not always consistent with the constitution. Suffice to note ZINWA Head Office holds more decision-making power and resources than lower level officials on the ground in some local authorities which may run contrary to an expansive interpretation of devolution. Aspects of the ZINWA Act (Chapter 24:24) under which decentralised structures were created (Catchment and Sub-Catchment Councils), local government and public health legislation need to be reviewed to align them with the constitution. Further, the role of central government has been criticised recently over pre-paid water metering (BPRA 2015). Citing the socio-economic context, the system's capital intensity and among others, supply deficits residents have resisted the technology. On the other hand, local authorities seem emboldened by central government approval of pre-paid water metering. This appears to have undermined dialogue between citizens and their local governments in a way that stifles prospects for a devolved governance system.

Gaps in Land Administration

Land reforms since 2000 triggered far reaching changes to agrarian structure and performance with implications on both the country's politics and economy. A 2003 Presidential Land Review Committee Report observed that 'acquiring and distributing land to the people under A1 and A2 was undertaken in a complex legal framework which rendered the process both difficult and cumbersome' (Government of Zimbabwe 2003:1). The Committee was 'struck by the number and variety of legal issues that still required resolution in respect of the acquisition procedures, the allocation of land, assessment of the value of improvements, ownership and access to moveable assets' adding that 'the governmental machinery for administering these matters was taxed to the limit' (Ibid:1-2). The resilience of some of the unresolved issues around property rights and equity issues regarding land reforms have had an effect on local authority financial and overall governance viability considering the centrality of land to governance and development. Revenue from Unit Tax for rural local authorities has suffered serious strain if not near collapse in some jurisdictions. The rates databases that Councils held prior to the post-2000 land reforms have not been fully rebuilt given the centralisation of land redistribution information. Where available the centralisation of allocation reduces beneficiaries' administrative and developmental loyalty to sub-national governments. Cases of multiple and continuous allocations of some properties and refusal to pay by prominent beneficiaries are cited by many Councils. The District Land Committee decisions are not always taken into account undermining the legitimacy of local government and resulting in billing challenges.

A directive issued in June 2015 provides that A1 and A2 farmers will pay land rentals and unit tax to the Ministry responsible for lands (centralisation) rather than to local governments as was the case previously. The directive potentially contradicts the Third Schedule and Section 96 of the RDC Act (Chapter 29:13) as well as Section 6.2 of the Public Finance Act of 2009. There are active debates around further centralisation of revenue sources previously meant for local governments. Further, challenges with ZINARA funds where local government accountability is now to the Authority for resources previously ring-fenced for local government and loss of predictability of the source are cases in point. Evidently in both cases of land tax and the basket of sources centralised at ZINARA

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

some 'division by exclusion' of the centre is required to ensure that local governments retain viable local revenue sources. Recognised capacities or comparative advantages of national authorities for instance in standard setting and data aggregation are insufficient justifications for appropriating revenue sources meant for and functions previously performed by local governments. To the extent that Cabinet in particular and central government Ministries generally approve measures potentially at variance with devolution their preparedness is doubtful.

A further question is whether the contested and unresolved nature of Zimbabwe's land reforms will be subjected to resolution using a devolved governance system where transparency and accountability, rule of law and respect for property rights and due process are observed. This is complicated when considered in light of the majority of the current governing class having benefited from the land redistribution and forming the core of ratepayers who owe service delivery institutions including Councils in unpaid rates and levies. The political-bureaucratic land reform beneficiaries who have resisted previous attempts at a comprehensive and transparent land audit are not expected to readily support devolution in this sector.

Land administration gaps are not only peculiar to rural land but also affect urban and peri-urban land. A government audit of land management and allocation issues in Chitungwiza Town and Seke District observed that a vacuum left by central and local government in the housing sector was occupied by 'land barons, housing cooperatives...errant Councillors and Council officials...[as] the opportunity...presented them with options for massive private gain in the face of legislative and administrative inadequacies' (Government of Zimbabwe 2013c:29). However, central government had a role in some of the allocations of state land within or adjacent to Municipal areas reflecting strategic contradictions that require untangling in the interest of good land governance.

Land administration functions and land information systems therefore need devolved management (Chatiza 2003). That national institutions appear least prepared to devolve seems clear. The net effect is that revenue sources and management of public affairs in areas for which local governments are established as defined in the Constitution will be difficult unless land administration policy aspects are devolved (Ibid). Effectively dealing with the land tax for local government will, with inevitable central resistance, set the stage for addressing the local government finance question in Zimbabwe.

Are National Institutions Prepared to Implement Devolution?

On two simple accounts this paper suggests that national institutions are neither prepared nor preparing for devolution. The first is that these institutions have deliberately failed to support the development of whole-of-government and sector specific policy frameworks for devolution. Further to this, legislative reforms are uncoordinated as a consequence, resulting not only in reform delays but a heightened risk of both shallow reforms and contradictory policy, legislative and organizational proposals. The second factor is that existing sector policy and programmatic log-jams including the reality that senior politicians and bureaucrats have their 'hands in the state cookie jar' as the case of land reforms show make it politically undesirable for them to devolve service delivery in key sectors. The self-interest obstacle is reflected in the extractives sector and in centre-local relations where some politicians and bureaucrats act to sustain justifications for non-devolution at local level. They do this as powerful local citizens and also in terms of the policy and administrative practices in the national institutions they oversee.

As such, despite the longstanding traditions and commitments, the national political and administrative culture seems averse to devolution. Related is the observation that the pressure arising

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

from the 2009-2013 Inclusive Government and the political contestation it provided resulting in the hatching of the Constitution has receded. This explains strategic moves towards recentralisation. Readiness is undermined by lack of implementation resulting in a failure to internalise democratic principles defined in laws, policies, regulations, institutional arrangements and new government structures. The post-July 2013 government's actions did not communicate devolution implementation.

However, building on the notion of devolution as a 'governance trophy' won by the post-liberation generation there is a need to strategise towards full implementation of devolution. Critically, political will needs to be drummed up for decentralisation by devolution (CLGF 2013). As observed by Manor (2011) political pressure is needed for devolution of substantial powers and resources while building accountability mechanisms for bureaucrats to elected representatives and the latter to ordinary citizens. In short, devolution will not be delivered from and by national government but through a cocktail of innovative pressures from below.

Conclusion: Can Devolution Implementation become a Reality?

The normative response as to whether devolution becomes a reality in Zimbabwe is yes and that it is inevitable. This assertion is based on the force that is currently latent in the Constitution and resists timings associated with over-reading signs from the current government. The enduring aspiration to be governed well intricately fuelled by seeking a 'good life' (Sithole 2002; see also Ross 2011) more than any secessionist agenda that some political actors fear is what keeps devolution on Zimbabwe's political agenda. Based on a comparison of international experiences Devas and Delay (2006) confirm the existence of real local demand for devolution. They cite post-Soviet Eastern Europe, parts of Latin America, post-apartheid South Africa, the United Kingdom, Spain, Northern Ireland, Uganda after the Museveni-led revolution, Kenya and Belgium, among others. As such, it is fair to reflect that Zimbabweans' desire for more devolved governance is consistent with internal pressures being placed on governments by citizens of other jurisdictions.

With all this in mind, we suggest specific options for devolution implementation to include drawing up of a Devolution Implementation Policy, Plan and Strategy targeting key national institutions and complete with robust research and communication processes. The devolution framework should be enshrined into law and its implementation funded. Specific pilots including of setting up Provincial Councils, restructuring state-owned enterprises and remodelling national Ministries based on the national action plan should be funded from the national budget. This will constitute a critical mechanism for driving devolution implementation with capacity development as relevant.

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

References

1. Ackerman J (2004) Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice pp447-463 in *World Development*, Vol. 32 No. 3;
2. African Union (2015) African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development; Analyzing historical trends and gazing into the future in de Visser J, Steytler, N and Machingauta,
3. BPRA (2013) A Framework for a Devolved Local Government System in Zimbabwe: A Discussion Paper, Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA);
4. BPRA (2015) Controversies Surrounding Prepaid Water Meters Policy: The Case of Bulawayo-a study contextualized within the framework of the National Water Policy in Zimbabwe, Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA);
5. Brand, C. M. (1991) Will Decentralization enhance Local Participation? in Helmsing, A. H. J., Mutizwa-Mangiza, N. D., Gasper, D. R. Brand, C. M. and Wekwete, K. H. (1991) (eds.) *Limits to Decentralization in Zimbabwe: Essays on the Decentralization of Government and Planning in the 1980s*. Institute of Social Sciences, The Hague.
6. CCMT (2015) Roles and Responsibilities in Rural Local Governance in Zimbabwe: Parallels, Overlaps and Conflict, Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT);
7. Chatiza K and Chakaipa S (2014) Report of a National Dialogue on Proposed/New Local Government Laws, August 2014, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing;
8. Chatiza K (2012) Inclusive Service Delivery pp42-54 in *Local Governments in Southern Africa: An Analytical Study of Decentralization, Financing, Service Delivery and Capacities*, UNDP;
9. Chatiza K (2010) Can local government steer socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe? Analyzing historical trends and gazing into the future in de Visser J, Steytler, N and Machingauta, N. (Eds.). *Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue*, Community Law Centre, University of Western Cape;
10. Chatiza K (2008) Opportunities and challenges in institutionalizing participatory development: the case of rural Zimbabwe, Doctoral Thesis, Swansea University (Wales-UK);
11. Chatiza, K. (2003) Whose Land is it Anyway? A Rationalization of and Proposal for a Devolved Institutional Structure for Land Administration in Zimbabwe in Roth, M. and Gonese, F. (2003) (eds.) *Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post-independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe*. Center for Applied Social Sciences-University of Zimbabwe and Land Tenure Centre University of Wisconsin-Madison.
12. Chinsinga B (2011) The Interface between Local level Politics, Constitutionalism and State Formation in Malawi: Through the Lens of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF);
13. Chinyama A and Toma T (2013) Understanding the Poor Performance of Urban Sewerage Systems: A Case of Coldstream High Density Suburbs, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe in *Urban Planning and Design Research*, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (September 2013);
14. Chirisa I, Muzenda A and Manyeruke C (2013) The Devolution Debate and the New Constitution: An Explanatory Evaluation pp86-103 in *Southern Peace Review Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2;
15. CHRA (2014) The Green Paper on Zimbabwe's Local Government System, Combined Harare Residents Association, August 2014;

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*,
http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

16. CLGF (2013) Developmental Local Government: Putting local government at the heart of development. Commonwealth Local Government Conference 14-17 May 2013, Kampala, Uganda Government of Zimbabwe (2013b) National Water Policy;
17. Conyers, D. (2007) Decentralisation and Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa. IDS Bulletin No 38(1).
18. Conyers, D. (2007) Decentralization and Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa. IDS Bulletin N° 38(1).
19. CPIA (2005) *Zimbabwe: The Next 25 Years*. Center for Peace Initiatives in Africa.
20. Devas N and Delay S (2006) Local Democracy and the Challenges of Decentralizing the State: An International Perspective, pp 677-695 in *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 5;
21. Development Governance Institute (2013) The 2013 Local Government Capacity Needs Assessment Report, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing and UNDP;
22. Economic Consulting Associates (2011) Zimbabwe Urban water Tariff Study, Final Report, Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank;
23. Feresu S. B. (Ed. 2010) Zimbabwe Environment Outlook: Our Environment, Everybody's Responsibility, Government of Zimbabwe;
24. Fombad C M (2011) Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on some Current Challenges and Future Prospects, LexisNexis;
25. Gasper, D. R. (1997) Decentralization, Coordination and, Integration: Reflections from Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Unpublished Paper.
26. Government of Zimbabwe (2003) Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. Charles M B Utete, Vol. 1, Main Report;
27. Government of Zimbabwe (2014) Report of the Auditor General for the Financial Year Ended December 2012;
28. Government of Zimbabwe (2013a) Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 20) Act;
29. Government of Zimbabwe (2013b) National Water Policy;
30. Government of Zimbabwe (2013c) Audit Report on issues of Land Management and Allocation: Chitungwiza Town and Seke District;
31. Government of Zimbabwe (2012) Impact Analysis and Development of an Exit Strategy and Plan for Water Treatment Chemical Support to Urban Councils and ZINWA, Price Waterhouse Coopers and UNICEF;
32. Government of Zimbabwe (2004) The Revitalization of Local Authorities-Presentation by the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing to Cabinet, August 12th 2004. Government of Zimbabwe.
33. Grindle M S (2011) Sanctions, Benefits, and Rights: Three Faces of Accountability, Working Paper No. 4, ICLD;
34. Hammar A (2003) The Making and Unmaking of Local Government in Zimbabwe pp119-154 in Hammar A, Raftopoulos B and Jensen S (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, Weaver Press;
35. Horgan G W (2003) Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations: The Emergence of Intergovernmental Affairs Agencies in Public Policy and Administration Vol. 18, No. 3, SAGE;
36. Hove M and Tirimboi A (2011) Assessment of Harare Water Service Delivery, in *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, Vol. 13, No. 4;
37. Huang Z, Li L, Ma G and Xu L C (2015) Hayek, Local Information and the Decentralization of State-owned Enterprises in China, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper;

Source; pp17-24 in *Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF*, http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

38. Human Rights Watch (2013) *Troubled Water: Burst Pipes, Contaminated Wells and Open Defecation in Zimbabwe's Capital*;
39. ICJ Kenya (2013) *Handbook on Devolution: The Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists*;
40. International Crisis Group (2011) *Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe's Stalled Reform Agenda*, ICG Africa Briefing No. 82;
41. International Crisis Group (2014) *Zimbabwe: Waiting for the Future*, ICG Africa Briefing No. 103;
42. Kauzya J (2007) *Political Decentralization in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa*, UNDP
43. Kriger N (2012) *ZANU PF Politics under Zimbabwe's Power-Sharing Government* pp11-26 in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* Vol. 30 No. 1;
44. Larbi G A (1999) *The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States*, UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 112;
45. Loewenson R and Masotya M (2008) *Assessing Progress Towards Equity in Health: Zimbabwe*, Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC);
46. Makumbe J M (1996) *Participatory Development: The Case for Zimbabwe*. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare.
47. Makwara E C and Tavuyanago B (2012) *Water Woes in Zimbabwe's Urban Areas: 2000 to present* pp151-180 in *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 1, 2;
48. Manor J (2011) *Perspectives on Decentralization*, ICLD Working Paper No. 3
49. Mapfumo A and Madesha W. M. (2014) *Challenges for Urban Water Supply: The Case of Masvingo Municipality* pp1-5 in *International Journal of Economic Research*, Vol. 5, No. 3;
50. Matyszack, D. (2013) *Mayoral elections and Zimbabwe's legislative I CHING*, Research and Advocacy Unit;
51. Matyszack D (2010) *Formal Structures of Power in Rural Zimbabwe*, Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU)
52. MDP and VNGi (2015) *Benchmarking Study: Draft Study*, October 2015;
53. Mlambo A S (2009) *From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965* pp75-114 in in Raftopoulos B and Mlambo A (Eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from Pre-colonial Period to 2008*, Weaver Press;
54. Municipality of Chinhoyi, the Zimbabwe Homeless People's Federation and Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless People in Zimbabwe Trust (2014) *Water and Sanitation Action Research in the City of Chinhoyi: Community Mapping Towards Inclusive Development-A Policy Brief*, London School of Tropical Medicine, IIED, ICDDR,B, SDI, Water Aid and SHARE;
55. Muzondidya J (2009) *From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1997*, pp167-200 in Raftopoulos B and Mlambo A (Eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from Pre-colonial Period to 2008*, Weaver Press;
56. Ondigi C N (2014) *Challenges Facing Devolution in Kenya: A Comparative Study* (Unpublished Paper);
57. Partnership Africa Canada (2012) *Reap What You Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe's Marange Diamond Fields*, PAC;
58. Raftopoulos, B. (2013a) *Zimbabwean Politics in the Pos-2013 Elections Period: The Constraints of 'Victory'*, Solidarity Peace Trust, <http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1703/zimbabwean-politics-in-the-post-2013-elections-period-the-constraints-of-victory/> (December 23rd 2014);

Source; pp17-24 in **Chatiza K (Ed. 2017) *The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 as a basis for Local Government Transformation: A Reflective Analysis, EC and CLGF***,
http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/file/publications/reports/local_government_constitutionalisation_in_zimbabwe_clgf_2016.pdf

59. Raftopoulos, B. (2013b) The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era pp971-988 in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 4;
60. Ribot J C (2011) Choice, Recognition and the Democracy Effects of Decentralization, Working Paper No. 5, ICLD
61. Ribot J C (2001) Integral Local Development: Accommodating Multiple Interests through Entrustment and Accountable representation. *International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology*, 1 (3- 4): 327-350.
62. Ross C, (2011) *The Leaderless Revolution: How Ordinary People Will Take Power and Change Politics in the 21st Century*, Simon and Schuster;
63. Sithole M (2002) *When People Revolt and Why? A Speech Made at a Mass Public Opinion Institute Seminar at the Monomotapa Crown Plaza, Great Indaba Room, Harare on 7th March 2002*;
64. Thomas E (2015) *South Sudan: A Slow Liberation*, Zed Books;
65. UNICEF (2015) European Union Grants Euro12 Million to Improve Health Sector in Zimbabwe, http://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/media_16578.html (downloaded 15/10/2015)
66. Wekwete, K. H. (1990) Constraints to Planning for Socialism in Zimbabwe in de Valk, P. and Wekwete, K. H. (1990) (eds.) *Decentralisation for Participatory Planning*. Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot.
67. ZILGA, Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank (2014) *Service Level Benchmarking for Urban Water Supply, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management in Zimbabwe: Peer Review Annual Report 2014*;
68. Zimbabwe Institute (2005) *Local Government: Policy Review*;
69. ZIMSTAT (2015) *Zimbabwe Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey 2014, Final Report*, Harare, Zimbabwe;
70. ZLHR (2015) *Statement on the General Laws Amendment Bill of May 8th 2015*;